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POLITICS VERSUS PRECISION: DID THE MIAMI-DADE 
SCHOOL BOARD VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT WHEN IT 
VOTED TO REMOVE ¡VAMOS A CUBA! FROM ITS DISTRICT 
LIBRARIES? 
ACLU v. Miami-Dade County School Board, 557 F.3d 1177 
(11th Cir. 2009) 
Lindsay M. Saxe* 
Juan Amador, a self-described political prisoner from Cuba, was 
outraged when he read the inaccurate portrayal of life in Cuba contained 
in ¡Vamos a Cuba!,1 a book in his daughter’s elementary school 
library.2 Amador promptly requested that the school remove the book 
from its library because the book was untruthful and “‘portray[ed] a life 
in Cuba that does not exist.’”3 At the end of a lengthy, four-tiered 
administrative review process, the Miami-Dade County School Board 
(School Board) voted to remove the book from all school district 
libraries.4 
In response, another parent and two organizations, the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the student government association, 
sued the School Board in federal district court, alleging that its actions 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. May 2009. A special thank you to my family, friends, Professor Dennis Calfee, 
Margaret Ayres and R.D. and Judy Brown—I would not be where I am today without your 
guidance and support. 
 1. ALTA SCHREIER, ¡VAMOS A CUBA! (2000); ¡Vamos a Cuba! is the Spanish language 
version of “A Visit to Cuba,” the book that spawned the litigation. Id. Before the respondent’s 
removal order, there were forty-nine copies spread amongst the district’s thirty-three elementary 
and middle schools. Id. at 1183. Consistent with the present court’s opinion, this Comment will 
adopt the Spanish-language title, ¡Vamos a Cuba!, as a means of identifying all forty-nine 
copies of the book. Id. 
 2. ACLU v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1182 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II). 
 3. Id. (quoting ACLU v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 439 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1247 
(S.D. Fla. 2006) (Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. I)). 
 4. Id. After reading the book, Amador initiated the school district’s four-tiered 
administrative process, which reviews citizen requests for the removal of books from the 
district’s libraries. Id. at 1183–84. This process begins with an initial complaint to a school’s 
principal, who does not have authority to remove the book, but may explain why the book is in 
the library’s collection. Id. at 1184. If unsatisfied with the explanation, the citizen may file a 
formal request for removal, which is heard by the School Materials Review Committee, an ad 
hoc group of professional educators, administrators, parents, teachers, students, and library 
specialists. Id. The School Materials Review Committee’s recommendation regarding the 
book’s removal can be appealed to the superintendent, who can either issue a decision based on 
the committee’s recommendation or submit the appeal to the District Material Review 
Committee, a similar ad hoc group of educational professionals and interested individuals. Id. 
Once the District Committee makes a recommendation to the superintendent, the superintendent 
makes a decision. Id. As a final administrative measure, the superintendent’s decision may be 
appealed to the school board, which issues the final ruling on behalf of the school system. Id. 
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violated the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause.5 Th  district 
court denied the Board’s motion to dismiss the complaint,6 ssued a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the School Board from enforcing its 
removal order, and ordered that any books already removed be returned 
to the district’s libraries.7 On review, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the 
preliminary injunction, remanded the case, and HELD that even if the 
First Amendment applied to book removal decisions, the Board’s 
actions did not violate it.8 
Neither teachers nor students forsake their constitutional rights to 
free speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.9 Th  Supreme Court 
has repeatedly affirmed the importance of First Amendment protections 
in the school context while also recognizing the authority of school 
officials to control student conduct.10 Because school libraries play an 
integral part in facilitating classroom discussion, federal courts 
generally view the removal of books by school boards for censorship 
purposes as imposing a serious burden on freedom of discussion, 
implicating First Amendment protections.11 Therefore, while courts 
often grant school boards significant discretion in determining the 
contents of school libraries, a school board’s motivation for removing a 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Id. at 1183. 
 6. Id. at 1189. The defendants sought dismissal on the basis that the ACLU did not have 
organizational standing to bring the suit through its member Mark Balzli, whose son attended a 
school within the school district, because any First Amendment right to the school’s library 
books belonged to the student and not the parent, and Balzli’s son was not a member of the 
ACLU. Id. 
 7. Id. at 1190. 
 8. Id. at 1230. 
 9. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Tinker, the 
seminal case balancing a student’s right to free speech and a school’s right to control classroom 
conduct, involved a passive student protest of the Vietnam War. Id. at 504. When the 
respondent found out that students planned to wear black armbands to school as a symbol of 
their objection to the war, they adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband would be 
asked to remove it and threatened with suspension. Id. Ultimately, the Court held that the 
respondent could not prohibit this form of student expression because it neither interfered with 
school activities nor caused any disruption that might have justified the respondent’s actions. Id. 
at 505, 513–14. “[T]he wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was entirely 
divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It was 
closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive 
protection under the First Amendment.” Id. at 505–06. See also RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, 
Freedom of Expression Issues and Public Education, in 1 EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, 
DUE PROCESS AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION , § 2:3 (2004 & Supp. 2007); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, How Will Morse v. Frederick Be Applied?, 12 LEWIS &  CLARK L. REV. 17, 19–20 
(2008) (noting that in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has not followed the holding in 
Tinker that student speech can only be punished if it is actually disruptive of school activities). 
 10. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); SCHNEIDER, supra 
note 9, § 2:3. 
 11. 16B EUGENE MCQUILLIN , Public Education: School Boards and School Districts, in 
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS XX, § 46.09.05 (3d ed. West 2008). 
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book is subject to scrutiny in cases challenging book removal 
decisions.12 
In this area of the law, the primary guide for federal courts is the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Education v. Pico.13 In Pico, the 
petitioner school board gave an unofficial directive that certain books be 
removed from library shelves and delivered to it for review.14 The 
school board later issued a press release justifying its actions, 
characterizing the books as “‘anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-
Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy,’” and announcing that it had a duty, a 
“‘moral obligation,’” to protect children from the danger presented by 
the books.15 After reviewing a claim challenging the school board’s 
actions under the First Amendment, a plurality of the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision to remand the case for trial.16 
Because of the fractured nature of the Court’s decision, however, the 
case did not establish a binding First Amendment standard for book 
removal cases.17 Justice Brennan, writing the lead opinion, found that 
the First Amendment prohibited school boards from removing books 
“simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and 
seek by their removal to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’”18 A school board 
could constitutionally remove a book, however, if the book lacked 
“educational suitability.”19 Only two justices, Justice Marshall and 
Justice Stevens, joined Justice Brennan’s opinion in full.20 In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Brennan’s 
First Amendment standard, but also formulated his own standard.21 In 
addition, according to Justice Blackmun, a school board could 
constitutionally remove a book if it contained offensive language, if it 
was not appropriate for its intended age group, or if the ideas it 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Id. 
 13. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
 14. Id. at 857.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 860, 875. 
 17. See infra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Blackmun’s First 
Amendment standard in contrast to Justice Brennan’s standard). 
 18. Pico, 457 U.S. at 872 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
642 (1943)). There were four dissenters—Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and 
O’Connor—who argued that the First Amendment did not limit a school board’s power to 
remove books. Id. at 885 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 893 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 921 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 19. Id. at 871 (plurality opinion). 
 20. Id. at 855. 
 21. Id. at 879–80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
Justice Blackmun found that “school officials may not remove books for the purpose of 
restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when that action 
is motivated simply by the officials’ disapproval of the ideas involved.” Id. 
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advanced were “‘manifestly inimical to the public welfare.’”22 Justice 
White did not express an opinion on the First Amendment question, but 
voted with the plurality for purely procedural reasons.23 
Ultimately, only four Justices in Pico found that the First 
Amendment applied to book removal cases. Four other Justices 
dissented, finding that the First Amendment did not apply at all.24 The 
final Justice expressed no opinion on the constitutional issue.25 In effect, 
then, there was no majority decision on whether the First Amendment 
applies to book removal decisions.26 Therefore, federal courts interpret 
Pico as a non-precedent, despite the plurality’s articulation of a 
constitutional standard, because the Court failed to establish a clear and 
binding First Amendment standard in book removal cases.27 
To complicate matters, the Court never decided another book 
removal case. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,28 the Court 
addressed the applicability of First Amendment protections to a school-
sponsored student newspaper, which was described as a part of the 
school curriculum.29 It is unclear, however, whether book removal 
decisions are an aspect of school curriculum and therefore subject to the 
Hazelwood standard.30 
In Hazelwood, the school principal ordered that two pages of the 
student newspaper, which contained stories about pregnant students and 
the impact of divorce on students, be withheld from publication.31 I  
                                                                                                                     
 22. Id. at 880 (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)). 
 23. Id. at 883–84 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Court should 
not decide constitutional questions unless it is necessary to do so). 
 24. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 25. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 26. See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. Four Justices found the petitioner’s 
conduct unconstitutional, four found it constitutional, and one expressed no opinion on the 
matter. See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. 
 27. See Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1045 n.30 (Former 5th 
Cir. 1982); Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 895 F. Supp. 1463, 1468–69 (D. Kan. 1995). See 
generally Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 756 (1980) (explaining that because plurality opinions do not contain a single 
line of reasoning that garnered the support of a majority of the Court, they provide spotty 
guidance and present problems of interpretation and application for lower courts). 
 28. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 29. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).  
 30. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d 1177, 1201–02 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 31. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263–64. The principal was concerned that even though the 
names of the pregnant girls had been removed, they would still be identifiable from the text of 
the article, and that the discussion of birth control and sexual activity would be inappropriate for 
some of the school’s younger students. Id. at 263. Moreover, the principal thought that the 
parents of the girl who was discussed in the article on divorce ought to have been given a 
chance to respond to the girl’s comments. Id. Because he felt that the necessary changes could 
not be made before the date on which the paper was scheduled to go to press, he told the paper’s 
faculty director to remove the offending pages or risk not having the paper printed at all. Id. at 
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response to the student author’s claim that preventing publication of the 
articles violated the respondent’s First Amendment rights, the Court 
allowed the school to censor the newspaper in order to “‘disassociate 
itself’ from speech that would ‘substantially interfere with [its] work or 
impinge upon the rights of other students.’”32 The Court distinguished 
Hazelwood from its student speech precedents by reasoning that 
suppression of a student’s personal expression on school premises 
differed from control over school-sponsored activities that “members of 
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school.”33 Accordingly, the Court held that the school had greater 
authority to control speech in this case because the student newspaper 
could fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum.34 Thus, 
school administrators would not violate the First Amendment as “long 
as their actions were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”35 
In the present case, the School Board ordered the removal of A Visit 
to Cuba or ¡Vamos a Cuba! from its libraries.36 ¡Vamos a Cuba! is part 
of a series developed for children ages five to seven years old to provide 
basic information about the lives of children in other countries.37 
Reversing the findings of two ad hoc committees of professional 
educators as well as the superintendent, the School Board voted six to 
three to remove the book.38 In response, the district court ordered the 
School Board put ¡Vamos a Cuba! back on library shelves.39 The 
Eleventh Circuit reversed, but in doing so, did not decide whether the 
Hazelwood or Pico standard applied to the respondent’s actions, or to 
book removal cases in general.40 Rather, the court reasoned that even if 
                                                                                                                     
264–65. 
 32. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist., No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) and Tinker 
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. The Court gave some examples of activities constituting part of school curriculum, 
which it said did not have to occur in a traditional classroom setting, including school-sponsored 
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that could reasonably be 
attributed to the school. Id. It added that the activities could be so characterized if “supervised 
by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants 
and audiences.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 35. Id. at 273. 
 36. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d 1177, 1182 (11th Cir. 2009). See supra note 1. 
 37. See Heinemann Library, A Visit To, http://www.heinemannlibrary.com/products/series.asp? 
id=1432912828 (last visited June 27, 2009) (indicating that the publisher intends the series to be 
used for children ages five to seven as a guide to help them understand what it is like to live, go 
to school, and participate in traditional ceremonies in other countries). 
 38. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1188. 
 39. Id. at 1190. 
 40. Id. at 1202 (finding that the question of what standard applies to school library book 
removal is unresolved). 
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the most exacting standard announced by the Pico plurality applied,41 
petitioners would lose if the respondent could show that it removed 
¡Vamos a Cuba! not because it disagreed with the ideas in the book, but 
because it had legitimate pedagogical concerns about the book’s 
accuracy.42 Given the court’s assumption that Pico’s First Amendment 
standard applied, the court determined de novo the constitutional facts 
of the case—the respondent’s motive in removing the book.43 
After reviewing the record, the court concluded that the School 
Board did not violate the Pico standard because the School Board’s 
motive for removing ¡Vamos a Cuba! stemmed from factual 
inaccuracies in the book.44 Based on its review of the book, the court 
went on to make its own findings that ¡Vamos a Cuba! indisputably 
contained gross inaccuracies.45 Specifically, the majority found most 
troubling the book’s pattern of comparing life in Cuba to that in the 
United States with the generalized statement that people live, work, and 
play “like you do[.]”46 According to the court, this blanket statement 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Id.; see also supra note 18 (discussing judicial opinions in Pico). 
 42. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1202. The court reasoned that a school 
board’s demand for factual accuracy was not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 
1222. 
 43. Id. at 1206–07. When a preliminary injunction is granted by a district court, it is 
subject to a mixed standard of review. See SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 
1198 (11th Cir. 1999). The reviewing court will assess the decision to grant the preliminary 
injunction under an “abuse of discretion” standard, while questions of law supporting the 
injunction are reviewed de novo. Id. Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Id. In Miami-
Dade County Sch. Bd. II, given the majority’s assumption regarding the constitutional standard 
that applied, it had to determine the “why” facts, or the school board’s motive, de novo because 
it was the core constitutional fact underlying the district court’s decision. Miami-Dade County 
Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d 1177, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 2009). The dissenting opinion agreed that the 
court should have reviewed respondent’s motive de novo, but added that the majority should 
have shown higher deference to the district court’s other findings of fact. Id. a  1232 (Wilson, J., 
dissenting). Thus, the dissent argued that the majority included many other fact findings that 
required greater deference in the court’s review. Id.  
 44. Id. at 1207 (majority opinion). The court explained that there were nine members of 
the school board, six of whom voted to remove ¡Vamos a Cuba!. Id. at 1209. Five of the six 
board members who voted for removal said that their vote was motivated by the factual 
inaccuracies in the book. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1211. The court classified these as inaccuracies based on affirmative 
misstatements and inaccuracies by omission. Id. For example, the third sentence in ¡Vamos a 
Cuba! says that people eat, work, and go to school like children in the United States. Id. at 1212 
(citing Transcript of Record at 28). The court found that in Cuba, food is rationed by the 
government and has been for a number of years, there is little private work and it is a crime to 
engage in private practice of a profession, and children are required to engage in unpaid 
agricultural work or be expelled from school. Id  (citation omitted). 
 46. Id. at 1212–14, 1224 (quoting Transcript of Record at 19:216). The district court 
found that the “like you do” statements in ¡Vamos a Cuba! were apolitical and content-neutral. 
Id. at 1224 (citing Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. I, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1283 (S.D. Fla. 
2006)). Disagreeing, the majority in Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II found that regardless of 
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covered up the fact that people in Cuba live under a totalitarian, 
communist regime with a poor human rights record, are subject to 
severe restrictions on individual liberties, and face a booming child sex 
trade.47 In a book about Cuba, the statement “like you do” could not be 
described as any more apolitical or content-neutral than the same 
statement in a book about the Third Reich, North Korea, or the 
antebellum South.48 
The court also took issue with the district court’s use of the term 
“book banning.”49 Historically, the practice of book banning has been 
based on a government’s political or moral objections to the book’s 
contents.50 Thus contemporary use of the term has a politically charged, 
pejorative connotation.51 Here, the court classified the use of the term as 
“overwrought rhetoric” and reasoned that it did not apply in book 
removal decisions because such decisions do not prevent anyone from 
owning, possessing, or reading the book.52 It simply prevented students 
from accessing the book at a school library.53 
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s 
finding that correcting the factual errors in ¡Vamos a Cuba! would 
                                                                                                                     
politics, the “like you do” statement was inaccurate. Id. The district court also found that a large 
number of the inaccuracies were inconsequential and that most of the omissions were proper in 
light of the age level and purpose of the book. Id. at 1232 ((Wilson, J., dissenting) (citing 
Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. I, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 n.42)). 
 47. Id. at 1213–14 (majority opinion); see also CIA World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html (last visited June 27, 
2009) (noting under “transnational issues” that “Cuba is principally a source country for women 
and children trafficked within the country for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation and 
possibly for forced labor; the country is a destination for sex tourism, including child sex 
tourism”). 
 48. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1224. 
 49. Id. at 1217–18. The district court found that by “totally banning the Cuba books and 
the rest of the Series, the School Board is in fact prohibiting even the voluntary consideration of 
the themes contained in the books by students at their leisure.” Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. I, 
439 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. 
 50. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1217–18. 
 51. See Mark Sableman, Artistic Expression Today: Can Artists Use the Language of Our 
Culture?, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 187, 191 (2007) (“Book bannings are generally classified today 
like the witch hunts of the past.”); see also Kathleen McGrory & Jay Weaver, Court: Miami 
Schools Can Yank Book on Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 2009 (“[T]he three-judge panel’s 
opinion—not unlike the School Board’s initial vote—was so fraught with political rhetoric such 
as ‘book banning’ that further appeals seem inevitable.”). 
 52. See Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1218. But see id. at 1230 (Wilson, 
J., dissenting); Claire Mullally, firstamendmentcenter.org: Libraries & First Amendment 
Speech, Banned Books, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/libraries/topic.aspx?top 
ic=banned_books (last visited on June 27, 2009) (describing the historical practice of book 
banning and applying the term to the modern practice of removing books from school and 
public libraries). 
 53. See Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1218 (majority opinion). 
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result in a book educationally unsuitable for young children.54 The 
majority gave two primary reasons for its disagreement. First, as a 
practical matter, simple removal of the phrase “like you do” could not 
possibly result in a book unsuitable for young children.55 Second, the 
educational suitability of a book was a policy matter better left to local 
government and was not within the purview of the district court.56 
At the outset, it is somewhat difficult to reconcile the court’s call for 
judicial restraint with the analysis it must undertake to determine 
whether a school board’s motive was permissible under the Pico
standard.57 If the educational suitability of a book is the proffered 
reason for the book’s removal, then a federal court must necessarily 
engage in some review of the book’s educational suitability.58 
Moreover, given the court’s reasoning that ¡Vamos a Cuba! is 
inaccurate throughout because it omits key facts,59 it seems unlikely a 
simple removal of the “like you do” statement would result in an 
accurate portrayal of life in Cuba. 
By reviewing the district court’s findings of fact apart from the 
respondent’s motive in removing ¡Vamos a Cuba!, the court also 
appeared to overstep its own authority.60 When a court reviews an order 
for a preliminary injunction, ordinary, non-constitutional facts are 
subject to a more deferential, clearly erroneous standard of review.61 In 
contrast, constitutional facts are subject to de novo re iew.62 Under the 
majority’s First Amendment analysis, the only fact subject to de novo 
review was the district court’s finding regarding the respondent’s 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Id. at 1225. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. The majority added that “[f]ederal courts should not arrogate to themselves power 
over educational suitability questions.” Id.
 57. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan 
found that the First Amendment prohibited school boards from removing books “simply 
because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to ‘prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’” Id. 
 58. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1244 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 59. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 60. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id.; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text; 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULES 64 to 
65.1, § 2962 (2d ed. 1995) (“The trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether 
the situation requires the issuance of either a temporary or a permanent injunction and the fact 
that the appellate court reaches a contrary conclusion does not warrant a reversal. The scope of 
review is limited to determining whether the lower court violated some principle of equity or 
abused its discretion under Rule 65. Furthermore, the district court’s findings of fact, which are 
prepared under Rule 52(a) when it either grants or refuses injunctive relief, will not be set aside 
unless they are clearly erroneous.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 62. See supra note 43 (discussing opposing views on whether the court could determine 
“why” facts).  
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motive.63 Despite this, the majority engaged in a de novo review of facts 
beyond the constitutional fact.64 With the exception of the respondent’s 
motive, the trial judge was arguably in a better position to make factual 
determinations.65 Thus, the majority’s extensive fact-finding leaves it 
open to the criticism that it treated the case as a decision on the merits 
and not an appeal from a preliminary injunction.66 
On the other hand, in the context of this case, many of the facts 
found by the majority on de novo review could be viewed as integral 
parts of the analysis in determining whether the respondent’s motive 
violated the First Amendment.67 The judgments regarding school 
boards’ motives, especially under Pico, encompass a wide array of facts 
including the school boards’ conduct and particular characteristics of 
books removed. 
Another difficulty presented by this case is the notion that without a 
clearly applicable constitutional standard, a reviewing court can analyze 
the sufficiency of the evidence for a preliminary injunction in school 
board book removal cases.68 In order for a plaintiff to successfully 
obtain a preliminary injunction, she must show a substantial likelihood 
of success on the merits.69 The plaintiff does not have to show that she 
is certain to win.70 In the present case, the majority and dissent 
employed different standards, and predictably, disagreed as to whether 
there was a sufficient likelihood of success under the chosen standard.71 
While the majority found that the petitioners did not make a sufficient 
showing under the most favorable First Amendment standard from 
Pico,72 the dissent found that the petitioners made a sufficient showing 
under the more school board-deferential standard from Hazelwood.73 
Furthermore, while this painstaking analysis was undertaken on the 
basis that the First Amendment applies in such situations, it is not 
entirely clear, given the outcome of Pico, that it does.74 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 577 F.3d at 1232; id. at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting); 
see also supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 64. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting).  
 65. Id. (noting that the district court was well within its discretion to determine what was 
the more persuasive and credible evidence). 
 66. Id.; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61 (discussing discretion in issuance of 
injunctions). 
 67. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1222. 
 68. Given the four dissenters in Pico, there is also some doubt as to whether the First 
Amendment even applies in school board book removal cases. See supra note 18.  
 69. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1232, 1233 n.2 (Wilson, J., dissenting); 
see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948.3 (“All courts agree that plaintiff must present a 
prima facie case but need not show that he is certain to win.”) (footnote omitted).  
 70. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948.3. 
 71. Compare Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1202 (majority opinion), with 
id. at 1234 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 1202 (majority opinion). 
 73. Id. at 1234 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 74. See supra note 68. 
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This divergence of opinion demonstrates the difficulty of making the 
“substantial likelihood” determination in the absence of an explicit First 
Amendment standard. Without an established standard, it is difficult for 
courts to review preliminary injunction orders, and for plaintiffs to 
predict the likelihood of winning a motion for a preliminary injunction. 
Moreover, until the United States Supreme Court definitively resolves 
the issue, school boards lack clear notice of what book removal 
practices, if any,75 violate the First Amendment. 
Compounding the dearth of guidance from the Supreme Court on the 
applicable First Amendment standard are the Eleventh Circuit panel’s 
completely contradictory findings regarding whether the respondent 
was politically motivated when it removed ¡Vamos a Cuba!76 Even 
though the district court found overwhelming evidence that the 
respondent’s removal of the book was primarily politically motivated,77 
the majority reversed because the factual inaccuracies in ¡Vamos a 
Cuba! constituted a legitimate reason for the book’s removal.78 On its 
face, this finding seemed to discount several of the main facts that led to 
the litigation. First, the original objection to the book was based on the 
viewpoint of a former Cuban political prisoner and exile.79 Second, two 
committees of professional educators, parents, and others recommended 
retaining the book.80 Finally, most of the respondent’s members did not 
read the other books in the “A Visit to” series before they voted to 
remove all of them from the school district’s libraries.81 
On the other hand, the initial objections to the book, as well as those 
of the respondent and the majority in this case, are based on true 
accounts of life under the totalitarian regime in Cuba.82 Given these 
realities were omitted from the book ¡Vamos a Cuba! is not factually 
accurate. Still unclear is whether the inclusion of all relevant facts in a 
book intended to provide the most basic information to young children 
is a tenable standard for judging books or for determining when a 
                                                                                                                     
 75. See supra note 18. 
 76. See Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1236–37 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. (reading the district court’s order as concluding that the respondent was using the 
stated reasons for removing the book as a pretext for political views that opposed the Castro 
regime). 
 78. Id. at 1236. 
 79. Id. at 1238 (quoting the district court’s reasoning that the truth or merit of Juan 
Amador’s objections was not at issue, and noting that the actual issue was “the state’s 
imposition of what shall be the orthodox view of Cuba”). 
 80. Id. at 1243. 
 81. Id. at 1243–44 (reasoning that the members’ failure to read the other removed books 
suggests that the board’s majority may have had impermissible motives for removing them). 
 82. See supra notes 46–47. 
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school district can constitutionally remove such books from its 
libraries.83 
The lack of clarity about the applicable First Amendment standard in 
school board book removal cases, as well as the importance of speech 
protections in the school context,84 demonstrates that the United States 
Supreme Court should revisit Pico and provide federal courts with 
greater guidance in this area. By failing to clarify Pico, the Supreme 
Court has fomented confusion and opened the door to circuit-specific 
standards, created on shaky and politically charged rationales. 
                                                                                                                     
 83. See Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1248 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 84. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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